{"title":"Series: Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRoutledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science\u003c\/strong\u003e offers thoughtful explorations into the foundations and developments of scientific knowledge. This series delves into the conceptual and methodological questions that shape how science understands the world, blending rigorous analysis with accessible insight. Readers can expect a nuanced engagement with themes from the nature of scientific theories to the ethical dimensions of research.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eIdeal for those intrigued by the intersection of philosophy, history, and science, these works invite reflection on the principles that govern inquiry and discovery. Whether approaching complex debates or fresh perspectives, the series illuminates the ever-evolving dialogue at the heart of scientific thought.\u003c\/p\u003e","products":[{"product_id":"conceptual-change-and-the-philosophy-of-science-by-david-j-stump-9781138890138","title":"Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science","description":"\u003cdiv class=\"book-description\"\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn this book, David Stump traces alternative conceptions of the a priori in the philosophy of science and defends a unique position in the current debates over conceptual change and the constitutive elements in science.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eStump emphasises the unique epistemological status of the constitutive elements of scientific theories. These constitutive elements are the necessary preconditions that must be assumed to conduct a particular scientific inquiry. Elements such as logic, mathematics, and even some fundamental laws of nature were once considered a priori knowledge but can change, leading to a dynamic or relative a priori.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eStump critically examines developments in thinking about constitutive elements in science as a priori knowledge, from Kant’s fixed and absolute a priori to Quine’s holistic empiricism. By examining the relationship between conceptual change and the epistemological status of constitutive elements in science, Stump puts forward an argument that scientific revolutions can be explained and relativism can be avoided without resorting to universals or absolutes.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e","brand":"Taylor \u0026 Francis","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47605255569644,"sku":"9781138890138","price":376.0,"currency_code":"NZD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0705\/7784\/8556\/files\/9781138890138-conceptual-change-and-the-philosophy-of-science.jpg?v=1778129036"}],"url":"https:\/\/bookhero.co.nz\/collections\/series-routledge-studies-in-the-philosophy-of-science.oembed","provider":"Book Hero","version":"1.0","type":"link"}