{"title":"Series: Great Debates in Philosophy","description":"\u003cp\u003eThe \u003cem\u003eGreat Debates in Philosophy\u003c\/em\u003e series invites readers to explore enduring questions and contemporary controversies across a range of disciplines. From ethics and value theory to technology and economics, these thought-provoking works encourage critical reflection on complex ideas that shape our understanding of the world.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eWith titles that span philosophy, psychology, business, and beyond, this collection offers insightful perspectives that challenge assumptions and expand horizons. Ideal for curious minds seeking to engage with the fundamental debates that underpin human knowledge and society.\u003c\/p\u003e","products":[{"product_id":"expression-and-self-knowledge-by-crispin-wright-9781118908471","title":"Expression and Self-Knowledge","description":"\u003cdiv class=\"book-description\"\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProvides a timely and original contribution to the debate surrounding privileged self-knowledge.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eContemporary epistemologists and philosophers of mind continue to find puzzling the nature and source of \u003ci\u003eprivileged self-knowledge\u003c\/i\u003e: the ordinary and effortless ‘first-person’ knowledge we have of our own sensations, moods, emotions, beliefs, desires, and hopes.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eExpression and Self-Knowledge\u003c\/i\u003e, Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright articulate their joint dissatisfaction with extant accounts of self-knowledge and engage in a sustained and substantial critical debate over the merits of an expressivist approach to the topic. The authors incorporate cutting-edge research while defending their own alternatives to existing approaches to so-called ‘first-person privilege’.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eBar-On defends her neo-expressivist account, addressing the objection that neo-expressivism fails to provide an adequate epistemology of ordinary self-knowledge, and addresses new objections levelled by Wright. Wright then presents an alternative \u003ci\u003epluralist\u003c\/i\u003e approach, and Bar-On argues in response that pluralism faces difficulties neo-expressivism avoids. Providing invaluable insights on a hotly debated topic in epistemology and philosophy of mind, \u003ci\u003eExpression and Self-Knowledge:\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cul\u003e\n    \u003cli\u003ePresents an in-depth debate between two leading philosophers over the expressivist approach.\u003c\/li\u003e\n    \u003cli\u003eOffers novel developments and penetrating criticisms of the authors' respective views.\u003c\/li\u003e\n    \u003cli\u003eFeatures two different perspectives on the influential remarks on expression and self-knowledge found in Wittgenstein’s later writings.\u003c\/li\u003e\n    \u003cli\u003eIncludes four jointly written chapters that offer a critical overview of prominent existing accounts, which provide a useful advanced introduction to the subject.\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eExpression and Self-Knowledge\u003c\/i\u003e is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers of mind and language, psychologists with an interest in self-knowledge, and researchers and graduate students working in expression, expressivism, and self-knowledge.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e","brand":"Unknown","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47000618336492,"sku":"9781118908471","price":52.99,"currency_code":"NZD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0705\/7784\/8556\/files\/10031773482586.jpg?v=1763289630"},{"product_id":"knowledge-of-god-by-michael-tooley-9780631193647","title":"Knowledge of God","description":"\u003cdiv class=\"book-description\"\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIs belief in God justified? That's the fundamental question at the heart of this volume in the Great Debates in Philosophy series. \u003cem\u003eKnowledge of God\u003c\/em\u003e, authored by Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, presents a compelling discourse on this topic.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eEach philosopher tackles the matter with distinctive arguments from opposing perspectives. The book opens with an explanation of each philosopher's viewpoint, providing a clear understanding of their foundational beliefs.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eThis is followed by a lively and engaging conversation in which each philosopher directly responds to the other's arguments, offering readers a unique opportunity to witness an intellectual exchange between two leading thinkers.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e","brand":"Unknown","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47000665161964,"sku":"9780631193647","price":78.99,"currency_code":"NZD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0705\/7784\/8556\/files\/19810993482412.jpg?v=1763294872"},{"product_id":"epistemic-justification-by-laurence-bonjour-9780631182849","title":"Epistemic Justification","description":"\u003cdiv class=\"book-description\"\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEver since Plato, it has been thought that one has knowledge only if one has belief, one's belief hits the mark of truth, and does so with adequate justification. The debate between Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa primarily concerns the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eBonJour defends a traditional, internalist epistemology, according to which epistemic justification derives from the subject's taking what is given to his conscious awareness, and accepting claims or steps of reasoning on an \u003cem\u003ea priori\u003c\/em\u003e basis. Sosa defends an externalist virtue epistemology. He rejects the sort of internalist foundationalism favoured by BonJour, while agreeing to put aside questions of knowledge and its conditions, in order to focus on epistemic, rational, justification.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eHe accepts that a belief's having a reliable source is not enough to render it thus justified. The two comprehensive positions that are the antagonists in this debate represent syntheses of the main views that have been proposed with regard to the nature of epistemic justification. The confrontation between them throws light on significant and interacting aspects of the subject.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e","brand":"Unknown","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47460796530924,"sku":"9780631182849","price":83.99,"currency_code":"NZD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0705\/7784\/8556\/files\/9780631182849-epistemic-justification.jpg?v=1774952315"},{"product_id":"moral-relativism-and-moral-objectivity-by-judith-thomson-9780631192114","title":"Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity","description":"\u003cdiv class=\"book-description\"\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDo moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house: there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it: she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eHarman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively, accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMoral Relativism and Moral Objectivity\u003c\/em\u003e by Judith Thomson and Gilbert Harman is a thought-provoking exploration of these themes.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e","brand":"Unknown","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47471204008172,"sku":"9780631192114","price":83.99,"currency_code":"NZD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0705\/7784\/8556\/files\/9780631192114-moral-relativism-and-moral-objectivity.jpg?v=1775236072"},{"product_id":"four-views-on-free-will-by-derk-pereboom-9781394161966","title":"Four Views on Free Will","description":"\u003cdiv class=\"book-description\"\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eA lively and engaging debate between four representative views on free will, completely revised and updated with new perspectives.\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFour Views on Free Will\u003c\/em\u003e is a robust and careful debate about free will, how it interacts with determinism and indeterminism, and whether we have it or not. Providing the most up-to-date account of four major positions in the free will debate, the second edition of this classic text presents the opposing perspectives of renowned philosophers John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eSubstantially revised throughout, this new volume contains eight in-depth chapters, almost entirely rewritten for the new edition. The authors state their different positions on the debate, offer insights into how their views have evolved over the past fifteen years, respond to recent critical literature in the field, and interact and engage with each other in dialogue. In the first four chapters, the authors defend their distinctive views about free will: libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism. The subsequent four chapters consist of direct replies by each of the authors to the other three.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eOffering a one-of-a-kind interactive conversation about the most recent work on the subject, \u003cem\u003eFour Views on Free Will, Second Edition\u003c\/em\u003e provides a balanced and enlightening discussion on all the key concepts and conflicts in the free will debate. Part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series, it remains essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students, lecturers and scholars in philosophy, ethics, free will, philosophy of mind, political philosophy, law, and related subjects.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003c\/div\u003e","brand":"Unknown","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47536591798508,"sku":"9781394161966","price":73.99,"currency_code":"NZD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0705\/7784\/8556\/files\/9781394161966-four-views-on-free-will.jpg?v=1776384139"}],"url":"https:\/\/bookhero.co.nz\/collections\/series-great-debates-in-philosophy.oembed","provider":"Book Hero","version":"1.0","type":"link"}